Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy
By: Sechser, Todd S | Fuhrmann, Matthew.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press 2017Description: 343, pp.ISBN: 9781107106949.Subject(s): Diplomacy | Relations -- International relations | Military policy | Nuclear warfare | -- Diplomatic relations | Nuclear arms controlDDC classification: 355.0217 Summary: Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive| Item type | Current location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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NASSDOC Library | 355.0217 SEC-N (Browse shelf) | Available | 51464 |
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| 355.0217 JAS-; Nuclear deterrence and diplomacy | 355.0217 MOR-; Deterrence now | 355.0217 RAJ-N Nuclear deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan | 355.0217 SEC-N Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy | 355.0217095193 NOR- North Korea and the nuclear weapons: entering the new era of deterrence | 355.02170954 NUC- Nuclear proliferation in South Asia: crisis behaviour and the bomb | 355.02170954 SOU- South Asia's Nuclear security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China |
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive
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